Thank you for joining us for this edition of the Modlin Global Analysis Podcast. I'm glad to be joined by Dan Modlin who will be asking a series of questions. These questions are going to be highlighting a conversation that we recently had at Lost River Cave in Bowling Green, KY, where individuals engaged in a rich conversation. On US-China relations as well as Taiwan,-China relations. So Dan, what were some of those questions that we had that day?
Dan
So one of the first questions that came up at this presentation related to the alliance framework in light of treaties. What's the current alliance framework in this part of the world?
Kevin
Particularly in the Asia Pacific, responding to China’s rise, it's a really important question and unique for exploring the politics of this. So Asia has a unique culture and process around alliances. Some people think is very different from the NATO framework that we're familiar with Europe. But it's worth noting that every region of the world has unique characteristics of their alliance or nonalliance frameworks, and Asia's relationships largely through ASEAN and other organizations are very much involved with consultation of the rich relationship on the economic front as well as political at the same time, these are not deep alliance frameworks. So as far as committing countries to each other to help with security questions, these are not dominant. Dynamics within their respective countries within Asia at the same time, the United States has deep alliance relations throughout that region, and that contextualizes what the alliance frameworks. So whether that be with Japan or South Korea. In his history of relations with the Philippines and the history of relations with India and Vietnam and of course, with Australia and that alliance. These are all part of that framework, but it's worth noting that each of these respective countries have improved relations in different ways, as some are more complicated. It's kind of a mix of countries that have bilateral relationships that are close with the United States and more favorable relations with each other. But don't necessarily have an alliance with each other, so this serves their security needs, but it also for them it allows more autonomy in decision-making. In the 70s, there was rich talk of creating an alliance framework that the US would sponsor for countries in Asia. That resembled a NATO framework and that did not get off the ground very successfully. And some people argue that that is an inherent trait of the region. That is more focused on economic growth than this, but it is worth noting that even within that looser configuration that many of these countries are responding to China's rise and they are thinking about that in a security framework in ways that they haven't really thought of. For so many of them continue to trade with China, as most countries do they're also looking at the security questions because if if they do have a rising power in their neighbor in their region, of course that would have any consequences for them and their policies.
Dan
During the presentation, it was suggested by some of the questioners that China at some point might try to create a crisis situation. To help unify people in China in the approach to Taiwan, do you believe that is likely? And how might such a crisis be shaped, or what? What form might that take?
Kevin
So crises obviously happen within relations, and it's also worth noting that those are the things that we notice in the politics among States and the domestic politics or these types of crisis. I think it's also helpful when looking at countries and their behavior to notice what context they are developing, the relationship between countries, how are they defining it, how are they defining it specifically for their population, and how that will mold the perceptions. What I think is an important thing to look at in China and Taiwan relationship is how much is China talking about Taiwan and reunification and these types of arguments. I don't know if states invade each other out of crisis, and one of the reasons why I question that is because anyone looking back at a country's behavior can make an argument that they're going through a crisis. It seems that the news of every country, every day has some type of a problem of some type of internal discord and division that people could go back and point to and say that that is the source of a conflict. I certainly think it's possible, but I also think we need to look more at the dynamics, and one of the dynamics I think is most helpful is to look at these language patterns as well as just to unpack where the interests lie. So China’s military has expanded significantly in the region and especially just across the Strait with Taiwan. These are the types of patterns I would look at more towards the specific questions around crises.
Dan
In that region of the world, of course, naval forces would be very important should some kind of. Military action takes place if you would talk just a little bit about the difficulty of carrying out successful naval operations.
Kevin
As I mentioned in the meeting, one of the most difficult actions a military can take is the naval invasion of another country has a lot to do with how the defense is heavily favored in that situation, as well as how intricately. The operation has to be planned and executed for a landing, and it has to expect significant losses in the process so that the defensive side, in this case, Taiwan, be strongly favored to be able to repel an operation. We're not aware of any capabilities or trainings or experiences that China has had with this to indicate that they are fully prepared for this. Now some states are willing to incur significant losses to have able to reach an objective. But I think at this point it's really important to notice how risky an effort that would look like likely involves many thousands dying on the Chinese side and the possibility of not achieving the objective at all or being delayed by many, many months. That has led me to consider the fact that if the state really is interested in Taiwan. It was possible that they could achieve some of those objectives. More subtle means and less risky, so throughout history, we notice the risks that countries take, and I think it's also worth noting the times that politicians are actually trying to avoid risks. Because I see the downside problems for that, and I think that at least that's a framework that needs to be thought through just as actively. As we think about the more aggressive and kinetic or conflictual options.
Dan
Well, Kevin, obviously, there are a lot of unknowns in this situation, but where do you think the situation with Taiwan and China is headed?
Kevin
A lot of people have this question. I think it's important to organize the question and the different frameworks that we look at this question use them to test against each other. So we can better understand the situation. So it's not as much about predicting what happens, but strengthening our thinking throughout our situation to help us prepare for understanding how different paths may diverge. I am not certain that a conflict is inevitable. I know there's a lot of rhetoric around that. But again, people can be very certain of things. That to me, is unclear. That is a scenario that has to be considered, but I'm not certain of that. We could say one option that China may consider would be this naval operation that we referenced a few minutes ago. Again, I think because of those risks. Has to be considered, but it also has to be considered, probably as a less favorable choice from the Chinese political objective. One of the reasons also for that is because I think that they have other options that may be more appealing to them. And this has more to do with less conflictual type options to them that may achieve similar objectives that they have. So, as we know, Taiwan's diplomatic standards throughout the globe is very different from what most other countries have in their relations among states. Only 12 countries recognize Taiwan, only 12 have formal diplomatic ties. Other countries, of course, trade with Taiwan and have interesting economic interactions on computer chips and services, and some agriculture and shipping. But the leverage that China has over Taiwan may be more around its diplomatic state, and I think something that has to be really considered is that China may decide to challenge Taiwan in that diplomatic realm in a way that Taiwan would have difficulty responding to so. Pursuing that option may not mean very much conflict. But if China develops a policy or a practice that makes it hard for Taiwan to address it, and maybe it's a practice that the global community outside of protest and it may not have much reason of supporting Taiwan. Then China would have found this middle sweet spot to achieve their objective, basically pointing out that the global community may not support Taiwan and this could create a political crisis that could create a lot of challenges for Taiwan in that scenario. So I think that that type of interaction is just as possible, if not more so. As the conflictual one and affect may proceed more of a conflict option in China's mind because again, it's a lower risk choice from their perspective. Another option that it's gaining more conversation among people is the possibility of some type of a naval blockade. And it's important when thinking through that type of scenario. But that would mean economically, of course, for China and Taiwan and globally, it would elicit a strong response and and outcry, but it would actually put the political impetus on other countries. To respond. Meaning who's going to break that blockade? Who is going to be seen as challenging that and I think many countries would be unlikely to do that, and there aren't many countries that have the Navy and the capabilities to challenge that. China can have huge political effects in Taiwan and may not even have to invade to achieve that, and maybe they will hold that option as the last one and go through a series like this and considering these scenarios, these are of course all hypothetical, and in fact I think that option to testing against all of this. Is the status quo option and our mindsets when we think about international politics or read our history. We think events are inevitable. We think that a crisis precedes a higher crisis and things continue to escalate up that rung. In fact, there are many cases. When we really dig into the relations among countries where things deescalate and there's less tension. So whether that be Taiwan and China, relations having an ebb and flow throughout and 70s and the 90s and today, they have continuously changed and there have been a number of periods of more positive relations. Right now there's more tension. But the tension doesn't always cause more. And that's a really difficult thing for us to get our heads around. But I think that that situation is something worth testing against that the status quo or improved relations are possible and to look at the causal mechanisms that we see within. Each of these arguments and see what may play out and prepare for all these scenarios? So in our conversation we also talked about how this may play out for domestic economies and there's a lot of interest in computer chips and how if more computer chips are made in the West and the United States and Europe. That that will mean that there is a more secure access to these materials and I think that that is true. At the same time, probably in any of these scenarios, Taiwan will be a significant player in the computer chip manufacturing sector for a long time. In any of these crisis points that I'm outlining will certainly cause a sharp increase in the price of computer chips. And so while there may be access to these chips, the costs themselves may be prohibitive, or at least very costly for individual firms. So this does not necessarily solve all of these problem points, they can still have big effects. This is not unlike the experience that everyone's having with gas prices. The United States supplies a significant share of its own oil. Nearly 90%, but it's still subject to the global demand chains and global market behavior ,and of course that has pushed the price for gas. Throughout this war with Russia's invasion of Ukraine it's not that different, I would argue, is what may transpire with computer chips.
Dan
Well, it's a huge issue and in our next podcast, we're going to be talking about the Six Assurances and also talking a little bit about the thinking of the Chinese leadership. Kevin, thank you very much for your input and your perspective on all these issues.
Kevin
Thank you, everyone, for your time. I really appreciate all the interest and conversations that people had throughout that meeting. I welcome people to submit questions to me here through e-mail. You can email Kevin@modlinglobalanalysis.com and you can subscribe to the newsletter at modlinglobal.substack.com. Thank you.
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