Welcome. Thank you for joining us for this edition of the Modlin Global Analysis podcast. I'm really glad to be joined by Dan Modlin, and we are continuing a conversation about Taiwan policy, U.S. policy with Taiwan, as well as Taiwan's. Relation to China and, of course, China's relationship with the United States. Dan, we had a lot of really interesting engaging questions that we had from people from that recent meeting and we organized those and into some thematic conversations that we're going to have. This week we're going to talk a lot about the goings on in China and how their policy directions are influencing this relationship. But first I thought it would be helpful for us to revisit the theme of the meeting around strategic ambiguity in some of the concepts and tenants that have evolved. And U.S. policy through that.
Dan Modlin
OK Kevin. How does strategic ambiguity relate to the Six Assurances?
Kevin Modlin
The United States, the Three Communiques that it has sent to China and was statements mutually agreeing on practices and recognizing each other diplomatically. These statements set a framework for the relationship between China and the United States. In those exchanges, there's no seat at the table for Taiwan in these conversations, and as the United States was drafting the third communicate, Taiwan had concerns about being left out of this situation. And made suggestions on how to improve. That relationship and want to improve standing and what was suggested was the United States could draft some assurances to Taiwan and make this publicly known of what the United States would do and would not do. And what's important to note from those assurances is the arguments within them as what is said. So it talks about no pressuring Taiwan and China into resolving the issue, not setting a definite date to end military hardware sales to Taiwan. Not pressuring Taiwan in a lot of ways, and it's interesting that these are framed as assurances because every article of the agreement or the statement is in the negative saying what the US would not do. See and the US would not pressure Taiwan in this regard or would not seek out China to resolve differences or would not consult China first on questions. These are taken as assurances, but it could actually be viewed in a slightly different way that the negative language using this means. I mean. The use of not what will not be done is a very different framework to argue and think through than a framework that is in a positive direction of what will be done. So if I have an agreement between two people and one is an outline of things that they will. Are obligated to do, say, in a contract relationship. These are types of things that people can really have some type of. Certainty that they will. Be fulfilled or have some type of an assurance. So I think it's very interesting and assurance is taken from a framework that is in the negative and I would argue that this is on purpose because it actually continues. This general ambiguity of the relationship.
Dan Modlin
And so for those who might not have joined us for the last podcast, there's actually a strategy involved here where it's it's to the benefit of some US negotiators to be ambiguous about what the policy is.
Kevin Modlin
So the US policy with Taiwan is a position that we call strategic ambiguity, and the ambiguity is around whether or not the United States would intervene and assist Taiwan if they were to face a threat or invasion from China. So by not stating that, it's argued that it doesn't escalate tensions with China, but it also doesn't encourage Taiwan to seek independence in that way, it maintains something of a status quo in the relationship and possibly reduces their risks around conflict.
Dan Modlin
OK, now let's talk a little bit about the Chinese leadership and where that leadership is coming from at this point. There are obviously a lot of economic challenges, some maybe some problems in unifying people in China right now. Where is Chinese leadership coming from right now, in your opinion?
Kevin Modlin
That's a great question and it's important to note that it's always challenging to get inside any person's head. We know this whenever we follow politics, it's a lot of times the most inaccurate information is when we speculate on what a person or leaders are thinking because there's a lot of incomplete information. Around this and the analysis frameworks that we have are problematic. I think it's more beneficial to pause and work backwards from the few things that we do know and let that fill in. Our assessments and our analysis of leaders, instead of doing the opposite, filling it in with speculation, so we know that any leader has just like any human being, is faced with a range of interests and emotions and sentiments. And of course, that the case in China we know for centuries it's been an important for stability of the state. But of course we can argue that nearly every political system upholds that framework for that idea. So we know that the Chinese Communist Party finds its central goal is to maintain stability in the system both for the parties interests as well as overall state, and we'll find that as a primary objective. For that, so whatever economic policy that is, that ends whatever social policy that is the ends, and we have to assume that that's the. Case also for the foreign policy. So how do we fit that broad concept within that behavior? It's not always easy, but I think that that is a more healthy starting point within there. And then we just take a look at the patterns of relations and current policies. So there is increased notice of how China's economy is slowing down. Some of this has to do with COVID. And the COVID policies around that, but also they're talking about a dual circulation economy that basically emphasizes exports as well as domestic consumption. So by their society consuming goods that they're manufacturing, they may actually play less of a role in the global marketplace over the coming decades. What may be accelerating that are the tensions that China and the US have on a host of issues that we're aware of, but increasingly, both sides are adopting restrictive policies on technology chips, financial flows. At some point, that will have a real chilling effect and I think we are already witnessing that. But at some point, many, many firms will find it less beneficial to engage in economic relations with China. And that will contribute to this different arc of China’s policy. So I don't have to know perfectly the sentiments of each individual and it's possible even knowing the sentiments can have a different outcome than that we can just watch the behavior. And extract a general pattern of relations.
Dan Modlin
Another interesting issue to watch is what impact the Russian problems in their invasion in Ukraine might have on the way Chinese leadership would view Taiwan. What's that situation?
Kevin Modlin
Yeah, that's a great point. I have a slightly different perspective from some folks. Some individuals look at the war in Ukraine. And assume that it is an encouraging development for China because maybe it inspires them to do the same, more that so and so responded to Russia a certain way and that will inspire China. I would say the poor execution and the. Dismal effects of the Russian invasion from the Russian perspective would have to give any country pause to reconsider any type of a major military operation. As we discussed in the previous episode about the challenges of naval operation, that's got to be at least 10 times more challenging than the operations that Russia is facing today. And again, I'm not convinced that is what China wants to face that, or if they have those capabilities in the present, that's the source of debate right now, and perhaps over time, they will improve those. It's far from certain, but I think actually the challenges that Russia. Facing would be a more realistic assessment of how many countries would face a challenge in a military operation at that scale and the challenges of mobilizing a population. The challenges of combined operations. And the possibility of not turning out as expected. I think any state would have to recognize the challenges on that front if they're being realistic.
Dan Modlin
So it seems that the Chinese leadership really has some pretty tough issues to address as they move to the future and try to accomplish these somewhat contradictory goals.
Kevin Modlin
Right, right. So it it's both a goal of continuing to grow and provide for the needs of its population and possibly a population that has increased expectations of what income and wealth, and well-being are. Then there were the expectations of a few decades ago, and that's going to possibly be in tention. These efforts to be more inward looking and have slower economic growth. I think that again they will emphasize party security, the preeminence of the Chinese Communist Party. But I also think that it will create some very real challenges and having fewer resources. This means you're not as able to solve some of those problems. So we'll have to see how China prioritizes this. It'll be very interesting to see if they prioritize, say, nuclear modernization in the same way, I think they'll still uphold that or what will they do with with their Navy and investments in that front. This will force harder choices. Going forward, so we'll have to watch that part carefully as well.
Dan Modlin
Kevin, if someone listening to this podcast has a question they would like to have addressed, what should they?
Kevin Modlin
Sure, there anyone's always welcome to e-mail me at kevin@modlinglobalanalysis.com and I'm glad to have a conversation on these points. I think this conversation that we had at Lost River Cave recently is a great example of what comes out of these conversations. I was really interested in the number of people who had been to China. Or to Taiwan and had really great examples of personal stories and thought very seriously about these relationships. And I know this is a pattern globally, and I hope this podcast can be a platform where people can submit questions and we can think more deeply about these questions. Just as the people that we spoke with the other day did so feel free to e-mail me any time, and we'll continue talking about that in the next episode, I plan on talking about and more dynamics in China and specifically the small changes that may have really make effects in economic policy going forward, so I look forward to having that conversation with you, Dan, and we'll continue that.
Dan Modlin
Thank you very much again.
Kevin Modlin
thank you.
Taiwan Pt. 4