Kevin
Welcome. Thank you for joining us again for another edition of the Modlin Global Analysis newsletter. I'm pleased to be joined by Dan Modlin, who's going to offer a series of questions to kick off our continued dialogue on Taiwan. We are focusing on how Taiwan came into being and how this relates to U.S. policy. So thank you again Dan, for joining us.
Dan
Thank you, Kevin. I think this is a very interesting subject, and I can recall back in the 1970s, when Nixon went to China, it was considered a major development in foreign policy. Tell us about the background of how that all came about.
Kevin
Right. So we know from historic accounts that it actually took some time for the U.S. to perceive this as an opening for a relationship with China. China internally was expressing a lot of dissatisfaction in its relationship with Russia, the Soviet Union, and specifically, was growing more resentful and distrusting. This came out through border skirmishes, as well as lack of exchange and basically the tenants that we would see be shared for a partnership between the two. This was surprising to a lot of Americans because a lot assumed that just because they had a similar political system under the framework of Communism that, that automatically would be a shared sentiment and in fact, most communists assume that would be how that would transpire as well. But we see political party movements often also take on this weight to responsibility of the state and sometimes, the state itself brings in interests that override even party philosophies. That may be an agreement with each other. But over time, Nixon, as well as Kissinger, started to notice some opportunities that they thought they could improve relations with China. And there were two most important reasons. Why they were focused on that? One is they thought that maybe if China was more distant from Russia, that it may isolate Russia more than the Soviet Union specifically, and that that would contribute to a better way to contain the Soviet Union, and it would provide a path for China and the US to have a mechanism to resolve. The Vietnam War, fighting throughout that conflict, that by improving those relations, they thought they could withdraw from Vietnam more easily.
Dan
Kevin, as you mentioned, Kissinger played a key role of course in these developments with China during the Nixon administration. What role would he play in the development of the communique?
Kevin
So it's important to note that even though people really emphasize the role of Kissinger, how much in a broad framework, the national security advisor and the president had a general sense of opportunities as well as philosophy and how to implement these things. Nixon actually wrote about this potential even before Kissinger did. Kissinger implemented a lot of initiatives through this. So while Mao and Nixon were meeting the seconds were involved in this set out the framework for how this relationship would be again because they're navigating these important questions. But of course, when you have an opening of relations between states, you're going to expect some type of a formal understanding or mutual statement, between the two of what that relationship entails. So again, it's largely to address the issues in Vietnam and provide an opportunity to distance China from the Soviet Union. But China is expecting things in return for this and throughout the communique there are statements where both will acknowledge that others position on an issue without necessarily seeding the others position or necessarily agreeing to those points. And this includes on the issues around Taiwan. So after Chiang Kai-shek flees to Taiwan and asserts his position in that, and, by the way holds the Security Council permanent seat that this garners distrust.
Dan
So Kevin, my understanding is that the communique then kind of opened the door for a series of negotiations relating to the positions of the countries and also, how they view Taiwan?
Kevin
Yes, that's correct. So after you reached the agreement through the 1st Communique, you have a series of other communiques and importantly, those communique are adopted after each additional presidency. So under the Carter Presidency and then the Reagan presidency are both emphasizing the standards and basically fill out what we come to understand as strategic ambiguity, meaning that the United States encourages positive relations between both Taiwan and China, and that it will not provide formal recognition for Taiwan. Also, that it would not seek to further inflamed tensions while simultaneously saying that it would provide military assistance to Taiwan contingent upon its general relationship with China. So if relations between Taiwan and China are seen as improving, it's implicit that they would seek to reduce some aid. And if tensions increase that they would increase that aid. These are instruments of the communique. A big part of this ambiguity has to do with whether or not the United States would actually assist Taiwan in the event of a war, so it is not formally stated whether or not it would support Taiwan in the event of a war, and the rationale is that this provides a space for diplomacy, but also an uncertainty. So if the United States were to say it would support Taiwan perhaps that would be a rationale for China to attack Taiwan because they would view that as an attack on sovereignty. Also, the United States, by avoiding recognizing Taiwan and a possible assertion for independence also would not provide a rationale for China to attack Taiwan. So through this ambiguity, we've created something of a status quo in the relationship between the United States and China, United States and Taiwan, and, of course, Taiwan and China. So this has been basically the instrument for the 1970s going forward to today, we've seen more affirmative statements by our current President Biden. Were he expresses support for Taiwan, but at the same time, the State Department and National Security Council will make statements that backtrack or try to contextualize the meaning of those terms. So in a way, it's a different type of ambiguity and what that means. So maybe the President may have a different sentiment than his team does but by maintaining this ambiguity, it's argued that this helps maintain a sense of stability for the relationship and maybe can encourage improved relations.
Dan
It's a fascinating concept, and it's one I know you've presented a research paper on recently at a political science conference in Chicago. Part of the idea here then is that by not being too specific about policy it allows a little more wiggle room.
Kevin
So by not declaring a position, it doesn't provide a reason for either side to escalate tensions in the relationship, and therefore it's given the perception, especially in the U.S., that that ambiguity has actually contributed to stability in the region. Which is a general interest, but it has also been useful for U.S. purposes by maintaining a position of ambiguity. It's not increased the level of commitments that they've made globally, which may be desirable both by the United States standpoint as well as existing allies. So allies always think about their alliance structure, but the partners that they have with them, to what degree are they committed?
Dan
And so it's it's kind of interesting if we think in terms of our policy, sometimes seeming rather confusing. Maybe that's somewhat by design.
Kevin
It's completely by design, and again, it's with the intent of not trying to increase tensions on both sides. Now it's important to note that just because that's the design, that doesn't mean that tensions still won't exist. And we have seen an ebb and flow in that dynamic in the relationship. But it's always maintained a degree of overall stability. The big question is, is as China increases in its military capabilities how will that affect their relationship with Taiwan? Does that mean that they are more likely to at some point attack Taiwan? This contributes to a lot of speculation that is hard to answer again because it's largely speculation. But we do see heightened concerns all across the board about this possibility, and the question is, is how durable is strategic ambiguity in light of this situation? But we do see continued practices, especially in Washington, by establishment figures seeking to maintain ambiguity in large part because they've seen it as effective in the past. But again, maintaining ambiguity is difficult because anytime somebody explains a policy on US-Taiwan relations, it can actually not always sound ambiguous, and depending on how people interpret the components or potential misstatements, it actually may not always sound ambiguous. Among the challenges that the US faces is the security challenges. But it's also a language challenge. That's something I will go more into in our briefing and presentation on May 4th at the River Birch Room at Lost River Cave. We'll also spend a lot of time not just thinking about the language issue, but thinking about how the various scenarios that may play out between China and Taiwan may contribute to global challenges and for challenges here in the United States and possible responses but also general economic effects.
Dan
It's a very interesting subject, Kevin and I know we'll be talking about it more here on the podcast for the Modlin Global Analysis and in some upcoming segments. But as you say on May 4th at 7:00 PM in Bowling Green, KY, you will be giving a presentation that will be in the River Birch room of Lost River Cave.
China and Taiwan Pt. 2